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Abstract
Human experience takes place in the line of mental time (MT) created through ‘self-projection’ of oneself to different time-points in the
past or future. Here we manipulated self-projection in MT not only with respect to one’s life events but also with respect to one’s faces
from different past and future time-points. Behavioural and event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging activity showed
three independent effects characterized by (i) similarity between past recollection and future imagination, (ii) facilitation of judgements
related to the future as compared with the past, and (iii) facilitation of judgements related to time-points distant from the present.
These effects were found with respect to faces and events, and also suggest that brain mechanisms of MT are independent of whether
actual life episodes have to be re-experienced or pre-experienced, recruiting a common cerebral network including the anteromedial
temporal, posterior parietal, inferior frontal, temporo-parietal and insular cortices. These behavioural and neural data suggest that
self-projection in time is a fundamental aspect of MT, relying on neural structures encoding memory, mental imagery and self.
Introduction
An essential quality of the human mind is the recall of past events and
imagination of future occurrences, creating jointly the subjective
‘mental time’ (MT) in which everybody is living (Tulving, 1985,
2002; Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Levine, 2004; Levine et al., 2004;
Schacter et al., 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). It is widely
accepted that past MT relies on episodic autobiographical memory,
allowing the re-experience of one’s personal past through the
subjective ‘projection’ of the self to a speciﬁc time and place
(Tulving, 1985, 2002; Levine, 2004; Levine et al., 2004; Buckner &
Carroll, 2007). Comparatively, future MT is thought to be based on
‘episodic future thinking’ or the ability to project the self forward to
pre-experience an event (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Fellows & Farah,
2005; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Suddendorf
& Corballis, 2007). This ‘self-projection’ involves a change of one’s
habitual self-location in time to the past or future; while imagining
oneself in MT, one is ‘projecting’ oneself to different ‘temporal
locations’ in the past and future [absolute MT (aMT)] and from these
new self-locations in time one may imagine different episodes
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Arzy et al., 2008; Spreng et al., 2009).
Moreover, from these new imagined self-locations in time, the
relations of life events to the past and future are regarded differently;
when imagining oneself as 8 years younger, last year’s events are in
the future (relative-future) in relation to the initially imagined self-
location in time and vice versa (relative-past) [relative MT (rMT)]
(Arzy et al., 2008). The importance of self-projection for MT
processing is also suggested by the activation of brain regions outside
the classical memory areas that were found to be recruited for MT,
including the posterior parietal cortex, which is probably related to
visual imagery and autobiographical memory (Addis et al., 2007;
Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007; Arzy et al., 2008;
Spreng et al., 2009), the temporo-parietal junction, which is a key
region for self-related processing and self-projection (Ruby & Decety,
2001; Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006, 2008; Buckner & Carroll,
2007), and frontal regions involved in semantic and episodic
memories as well as in self-processing (Gusnard et al., 2001; Addis
et al., 2007; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Arzy et al., 2008; Spreng
et al., 2009). Here we investigated the role of self-projection in time to
the past and future using event-related functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) with respect to two different kinds of stimuli (faces
and events). In Experiment 1, participants carried out self-projection
in time with respect to their own face and a familiar face (actor George
Clooney) that were manipulated to depict each participant’s and
Clooney’s face at a different age in the past and future. In
Experiment 2, self-projection in time was carried out with respect to
two-word descriptions of life events as employed previously by MT
studies (Szpunar et al., 2007; Arzy et al., 2008; Spreng et al., 2009).
Participants were asked to make judgements about past and future
faces (Experiment 1) as well as events (Experiment 2) from three
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different time-points: the present (Now), 8 years earlier (Past) or
8 years later (Future) (Fig. 1). This allowed us to test pre-experiencing
and re-experiencing independent of the present, past or future with
respect to different stimuli (faces and events) (Arzy et al., 2008). In a
further control task participants were asked to make self ⁄ other
discrimination judgements with respect to the same face and word
stimuli without changing their self-location in MT. Behavioural
measures and event-related fMRI activity showed similar patterns for
faces and events recruiting almost identical neural mechanisms. These
effects suggest that self-projection in time, independent of whether
faces or life events are employed, is fundamental for processing of MT
relying on brain mechanisms of memory, mental imagery and self.
Materials and methods
Participants
Twelve healthy volunteers (seven males, aged 29–38 years, mean ±
SD 33.7 ± 4.2 years) participated in the study. All participants were
right handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no
history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. All participants gave
written informed consent before inclusion in the study, which was in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and approved by the
Ethical Committee of the University of Lausanne (Switzerland).
Stimuli and procedures
In Experiment 1, face images of the participant as well as a familiar
person (actor George Clooney) were presented on a computer screen.
Using the FaceGen software (Singular Inversions, Canada), these
faces were modiﬁed to represent the participant’s and Clooney’s face
appearing as 4, 12 and 20 years younger (past) or older (future)
(Fig. 1, upper row). In Experiment 2, two-word phrases describing
different common events from personal life (e.g. car licence, ﬁrst
child) or non-personal world events (e.g. Challenger explosion,
hurricane Katrina) known to the participants were presented (Fig. 1,
lower row). In the experimental manipulation we asked participants to
imagine themselves in each session at one of three different self-
locations in time: Now (the present time), Past (8 years in the past) or
Future (8 years in the future). The different self-locations in time were
tested in separate sessions. In Experiment 1, faces of the participant or
of Clooney were shown and participants were asked to indicate
whether the presented face represented the participant’s ⁄Clooney’s
appearance before (relative-past) or after (relative-future) the imagined
self-location in time. For example, in the Now or Future conditions,
the participant should indicate ‘relative-past’ for their face image
depicting their appearance 4 years ago but in the Past condition, where
their imagined self-location in time is 8 years ago, they should
indicate ‘relative-future’ for the same face. In Experiment 2, partic-
ipants were asked to indicate whether the presented event from their
personal life or world history occurred before or after the currently
imagined self-location in time. Likewise, for example, in Experi-
ment 2, in the Now or Future conditions the participant should
indicate ‘relative-past’ for the hurricane Katrina but in the Past
condition they should indicate ‘relative-future’ because it has not been
8 years since the event. However, if they are anticipating their ﬁrst
child in the next few years they should indicate ‘relative-future’ for
‘ﬁrst child’ in the Past and Now conditions but ‘relative-past’ in the
Future condition. Thus, we examined MT dependently and indepen-
dently from the imagined self-location in time (Past, Now or Future).
As the same face ⁄ event could be relatively in the past or in the future
with respect to the imagined temporal self-location (Arzy et al., 2008),
we labelled this effect ‘rMT’, independent of the imagined self-
location in time. Self-projection to different points in time was labelled
aMT, dependent on the imagined self-location in time. Finally, in a
control discrimination task, participants were asked to indicate if the
same faces ⁄ events were self-related (self face in Experiment 1;
personal events in Experiment 2) or non-self-related (Clooney’s face
in Experiment 1; world events in Experiment 2) without changing
their habitual self-location in time.
Stimuli [FaceGen-generated faces and two-word phrases with
average length of 13.6 ± 2.5 letters (mean ± SD)] were designed to be
Fig. 1. Stimuli and procedure. The three different self-locations in time (Past, Now and Future) are shown. Participants were asked to mentally ‘project’ themselves
to one of these time-points and from these self-locations in time to judge if different face images (Experiment 1, upper row) or events (Experiment 2, lower row)
have already happened (relative-past, darker shades) or are yet to happen (relative-future, brighter shades). In a control task participants were asked to judge if the
presented face and events are self-related (self face images and personal events, respectively) or non-self-related (Clooney’s face images and world events,
respectively).
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in the range of ±20 years of the imagined self-location in time. Stimuli
appeared for 700 ms in the centre of the computer screen (presented
on 800 · 600 pixels Nordic NeuroLab Visual System OLED
goggles) with a jittered inter-stimulus interval ranging between 2300
and 5300 ms. Judgements were given using the index and middle
ﬁngers of the left and right hand in alternating blocks and counter-
balanced across subjects as a button press on a serial response box.
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and precisely as
possible. The two experiments were performed in four sessions each
(past, now, future and control) and counterbalanced across subjects.
Each session included 64 stimuli, equally distributed among four
groups: self (self faces ⁄ personal events) in relative-past, self in
relative-future, non-self (Clooney’s faces ⁄world events) in relative-
past and non-self in relative-future, appearing in random order.
Analysis of behavioural data
Subsequent to the experiment, participants were asked to approximate
the dates of the presented events. Correct responses for Experiment 2
were determined according to the estimated dates, as provided
separately by each participant. Repeated-measures anovas were run
between participants on reaction time (RT) and error rate (ER) with the
factors aMT (past, now and future), rMT (relative-past and relative-
future) and Self (self-related and non-self-related). Two-tailed paired
t-tests were run between participants on RTs and ERs for the control
tasks between self-related and non-self-related faces (Experiment 1)
and events (Experiment 2).
Recording and analysis of functional magnetic resonance
imaging data
In the present experiment event-related fMRI images were collected
with a Siemens Trio 3T system with EPI gradient echo T2-weighted
sequence on a 12 channel head coil at The Centre Hospitalier
Universitaire Vaudois and the Center for Biomedical Imaging of
Geneva and Lausanne, Switzerland. Each experimental session
included the acquisition of 108 volumes of 28 consecutive slices
each and covering the whole brain (TR, 3 s; TE, 60 ms; 64 · 64
image matrix; 3.5 · 3.5 · 3.5 mm isotropic voxels). The acquisition
plane was oriented parallel to the anterior ⁄ posterior commissure. As a
structural basis for activation display, a sagittal T1-weighted three-
dimensional gradient echo sequence (MPRAGE) was acquired using a
Siemens multiplanar rapid acquisition gradient echo sequence (1 mm
isotropic voxels; 160 sagittal slices; TR, 9.7 ms; TE, 4 ms). The
subject’s head was cushioned in the coil with a vacuum beanbag to
prevent motion.
The fMRI pre-processing steps, conducted with SPM5 (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK), included the
realignment of inter- and intra-session acquisitions to correct head
movement, normalization to a standard template (Montreal Neurolog-
ical Institute template) to minimize inter-subject morphological
variability and convolution with an isotropic Gaussian kernel
(FWHM, 8 mm) to increase the signal-to-noise ratio. Single subject
analysis was performed according to the general linear model. The
signal drift across acquisitions was removed with high-pass ﬁlter
(128 Hz) and global signal changes by proportional scaling. Statistical
parametrical maps of the contrasts of interest were computed for each
subject as input values for the group statistics based on random ﬁeld
theory. Corrections for multiple comparisons were used at the group
level to determine clusters showing a signiﬁcant effect in the anova
[false discovery rate (FDR)-corrected P < 0.05] with the factors aMT
(past, now and future), rMT (relative-past and relative-future) and Self
(self-related and non-self-related). Selected clusters were used as
regions of interest in order to extract the mean fMRI signal change for
each condition in every subject.
Results
Experiment 1: mental time with respect to face images
Behaviour
Data showed that RTs and ERs in Past and Future self-locations were
signiﬁcantly higher than in the Now self-location (aMT effect:
F2,22 = 4.52, P < 0.03; F2,22 = 12.4, P < 0.001, respectively; Fig. 2A
and B). In addition, these behavioural data also showed another effect,
i.e. participants were always faster for relative-future than for relative-
past faces, across all self-locations (rMT effect: RTs, F1,11 = 32.1,
P < 0.001; ERs, F1,11 = 12.4, P < 0.01; Fig. 2A and B). These effects
are independent of one another and we found no interactions among
them (aMT · rMT: RTs, F2,22 = 0.15, P > 0.8; ERs, F2,22 = 1.69,
P > 0.2). Behavioural results also showed an effect of Self (self-
related lower than non-self-related; RTs, F1,11 = 5.0, P < 0.05; ERs,
F1,11 = 16.2, P < 0.01; for more statistics and post-hoc tests, see
Supporting information, Table S1). Analysis of the control task also
showed an effect of Self, as participants were always faster for self
than for non-self faces (t1,11 = 32.5, P < 0.001). The aMT effect in the
present paradigm using faces representing different ages is parallel to
previous behavioural data showing an aMT effect with respect to
imagination of past and future events (Szpunar et al., 2007; Arzy
et al., 2008). Evidence for response facilitation for relative-future
faces (rMT effect), leading to faster and more accurate responses, is
similar to previously reported ﬁndings with respect to past and future
events (Arzy et al., 2008). Note that this effect was found indepen-
dently of the actual age of the presented faces, suggesting that the
mental processing of time is future oriented across all investigated
self-locations in time (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007; Dudai &
Carruthers, 2005; Schacter et al., 2007; Arzy et al., 2008; Boyer,
2008).
Neuroimaging
In order to examine the neural basis of MT, brain activity for MT in
the Past, Now and Future conditions was compared with brain activity
for face discrimination. Analysis for Past, Now and Future self-
locations revealed a network of brain regions that were recruited for
MT (Table 1). This network included regions in the left inferior frontal
cortex [Brodmann area (BA) 9], insular (BA 13) and cingulate
(BA 24) cortex bilaterally, right premotor cortex (BA 6) and supple-
mentary motor area, right medial temporal lobe (BA 21), fusiform
face area bilaterally (BA 37), right temporo-parietal junction (BA 40),
as well as lingual gyrus (BA 19), posterior parietal cortex (BA 7 ⁄ 19)
and occipital cortex (BAs 19 and 18) bilaterally.
In a subset of these brain regions, the percent of fMRI signal change
showed higher activation for the Past and Future self-locations than for
the Now, reﬂecting the aMT effect in concordance with the
behavioural results. These were the inferior frontal and medial
temporal cortex [F2,22 = 4.6, P < 0.05; F2,22 = 3.9, P < 0.05, respec-
tively (FDR corrected)] (Fig. 3, supporting Table S2). Signiﬁcant
differences between self-locations in time (aMT effect) were also
found in the posterior parietal cortex (F2,22 = 4.0, P < 0.05). The
posterior parietal cortex and insula also reﬂected response facilitation
for relative-future faces, showing lower activation for relative-future
than relative-past events (rMT effect: F1,11 = 9.6, P < 0.02;
F1,11 = 7.7, P < 0.02; supporting Table S2) independently of the
imagined self-location in time (no interaction of aMT · rMT:
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F2,22 = 0.29, P > 0.7; F2,22 = 0.11, P > 0.8; F2,22 = 0.07, P > 0.9,
respectively; Fig. 3, supporting Table S2). fMRI signal change
analysis at the right temporo-parietal junction showed enhanced
activity when imagined stimuli were temporally close to the present
moment (temporal distance effect; signiﬁcant interaction aMT · rMT:
F2,22 = 6.61, P < 0.01). We thus found a higher activation for relative-
future than relative-past in the Past condition, similar activation for
relative-past and relative-future in the Now condition and higher
activation for relative-past than relative-future in the Future condition
with no effects of aMT (F2,22 = 0.05, P > 0.94) or rMT (F1,11 = 0.04,
P > 0.95). Finally, comparison of self-related and non-self-related
stimuli revealed brain activations at the medial prefrontal (BA 9),
Fig. 2. Behavioural results. RTs and ERs obtained in Experiment 1 (faces, A and B) and Experiment 2 (events, C and D) are plotted separately for Past, Now and
Future self-location in time. Error bars indicate intersubject SEM. Both RTs and ERs were found to be signiﬁcantly higher for the Past and Future with respect to the
Now. In addition, in all self-locations in time (Past, Now and Future), RTs and ERs were higher for relative-past (left darker bars) than relative-future (right lighter
bars). Note the similarity of these two effects between the two experiments.
Table 1. Cerebral network recruited for self-projection in MT
Region
Experiment 1 (faces) Experiment 2 (events)
Z-score x y z Z-score x y z
L inferior frontal (BA 9 ⁄ 44) 4.95 )37 13 29 5.05 )50 13 13
R premotor (BA 6) 6.95 42 )4 52 4.43 36 )9 43
Supplementary motor area 6.94 0 11 51 7.23 )1 11 52
R insula (BA 13) 7.45 34 23 3 7.68 38 23 2
L insula (BA 13) 5.14 )33 13 8 5.16 )29 16 2
R anteromedial temporal (BA 21) 5.61 55 )27 )3 3.99 47 )16 )4
R hippocampus – – – – 4.52 31 )5 )15
R FFA (BA 37) 6.36 36 )47 )12 – – – –
L FFA (BA 37) 6.99 )34 )45 )15 – – – –
R temporo-parietal (BA 40) 6.00 57 )47 26 4.77 60 )48 30
R posterior parietal (BA 7 ⁄ 19) 5.53 27 )70 34 2.96 29 )81 33
L posterior parietal (BA 7 ⁄ 19) 6.13 )20 )71 45 5.82 )22 )73 35
R lingual (BA 19) 5.62 24 )59 2 3.11 32 )61 4
L lingual (BA 19) 5.88 26 )67 6 2.95 31 )79 16
R occipital (BA 18) 5.97 12 )71 17 3.03 18 )75 19
L occipital (BA 18) 3.11 )29 )68 )2 4.94 )34 )85 )10
FFA, fusiform face area; L, left; R, right.
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temporo-parietal (BA 40) and posterior parietal (BA 19 ⁄ 7) cortex
bilaterally (self effect; all p’s < 0.005; supporting Fig. S1), similar to
previous results (e.g. Ruby & Decety, 2001; Johnson et al., 2002;
Vogeley & Fink, 2003; David et al., 2006). Percent of fMRI signal
change analysis for the other implicated brain regions did not show
any of these or other differences.
Experiment 2: events
Behaviour
Data showed that RTs and ERs in Past and Future self-locations were
signiﬁcantly higher than in the Now (aMT effect: F2,22 = 13.0,
P < 0.001; F2,22 = 23.5, P < 0.01, respectively; Fig. 2C and D)
(Szpunar et al., 2007; Arzy et al., 2008). Replicating previous
ﬁndings (Arzy et al., 2008), there was also a behavioural rMT effect;
participants were faster for relative-future than for relative-past events,
with respect to their imagined temporal self-location, across all self-
locations (RTs: F1,11 = 6.5, P < 0.05; ERs: F1,11 = 11.68, P < 0.01;
Fig. 2C and D), with no interaction (aMT · rMT: RTs, F2,22 = 2.6,
P > 0.1; ERs, F2,22 = 2.54, P > 0.1) Behavioural results also showed
an effect of Self (self-related lower than non-self-related; RTs:
F1,11 = 6.4, P < 0.05; ERs: F1,11 = 12.4, P < 0.01; for more statistical
analyses and post-hoc tests, see supporting Table S3), replicating
previous ﬁndings (Arzy et al., 2008). Analysis of the control task also
showed a signiﬁcant difference between self and non-self events
(t1,11 = 77.7, P < 0.001; Self effect). These effects replicate those
reported in Experiment 1 with respect to faces across all investigated
self-locations in time.
Neuroimaging
Analysis identical to the analysis performed in Experiment 1 was
conducted to examine aMT, rMT, Self and temporal distance effects
with respect to events. Brain activity for MT in the Past, Now and
Future conditions was compared with brain activity for event
discrimination. This analysis revealed engagement of a network of
brain regions similar to those found in Experiment 1 (Table 1, Fig. 3,
right columns), including the left inferior frontal cortex (BA 9),
insular (BA 13) cortex bilaterally, right premotor cortex (BA 6),
supplementary motor area, right anteromedial temporal lobe (BA 21)
and right hippocampus, right temporo-parietal junction (BA 40) and
posterior parietal cortex (BA 7 ⁄ 19), lingual (BA 19) and occipital
cortex (BAs 19 and 18) bilaterally.
Fig. 3. Neuroimaging results. (A–E) Brain regions commonly engaged in the Past, Now and Future self-locations in time relative to the control task in
Experiment 1 (faces, left columns) and Experiment 2 (events, right columns). For all regions signiﬁcant in these analyses, past, now and future were engaged more
than the control task at a threshold of P < 0.05 (FDR corrected). Percent signal change data associated with each of these conditions are plotted. Note the similarity in
brain regions and signal change between the two experiments (see Table 1 for coordinates and Brodmann areas, as well as for regions that did not show a signal
difference between conditions).
Subjective mental time 2013
ª The Authors (2009). Journal Compilation ª Federation of European Neuroscience Societies and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
European Journal of Neuroscience, 30, 2009–2017
The percent of fMRI signal change in the posterior parietal cortex
bilaterally and the right anteromedial temporal lobe showed a signiﬁcant
aMT effect (differences between self-locations in time), similar to
ﬁndings in Experiment 1 [aMT effect: F2,22 = 5.98, P < 0.01;
F2,22 = 4.10, P < 0.05, respectively (FDR corrected); Fig. 3, right
columns; supporting Table S4]. In agreement with Experiment 1, the
percent of signal change in the posterior parietal cortex and insular
cortex bilaterally, as well as the left inferior frontal cortex, showed
signiﬁcantly lower activation for relative-future than relative-past
events (rMT effect: F1,11 = 9.60, P < 0.01; F1,11 = 11.27, P < 0.01;
F1,11 = 13.48, P < 0.01; Fig. 3, right columns) independently of the
imagined self-location in time (no aMT · rMT interaction, supporting
Table S4). As in Experiment 1, signal change analysis at the right
temporo-parietal junction showed higher activation for relative-future
than relative-past in the Past condition, similar activation for relative-
past and relative-future in the Now condition, and higher activation for
relative-past than relative-future in the Future condition (temporal
distance effect; interaction aMT · rMT: F2,22 = 5.76, P < 0.01; sup-
porting Table S4). Finally, similarly to Experiment 1, comparison of
self-related and non-self-related stimuli revealed brain activations at the
medial prefrontal (BA 9) and temporo-parietal (BA 40) cortex bilater-
ally with left predominance, and at the left posterior parietal cortex
(BA 19 ⁄ 7) (Self effect; all p’s < 0.005; supporting Fig. S1), similar to
previous studies (e.g. Ruby & Decety, 2001; Johnson et al., 2002;
Vogeley & Fink, 2003; David et al., 2006). The percent of fMRI signal
change analysis for the other implicated brain regions did not show any
such differences. Differences in brain activation between the two
experiments were found at the fusiform face area (activated for faces but
not events) and right hippocampus (activated for events but not faces),
with no effects of aMT, rMT, Self or temporal distance. This is probably
related to the implication of the fusiform face area in face recognition
(Kanwisher et al., 1997) and the right hippocampus in event recall
(Okuda et al., 2003; Squire et al., 2004; Addis et al., 2007).
Discussion
We studied MT by asking participants to project themselves to past,
now or future self-locations (aMT) and to indicate whether the
Fig. 4. Temporal distance effect. RTs obtained in Experiment 1 (faces, left column) and Experiment 2 (events, right column) are plotted separately for Past, Now
and Future self-location in time, and are grouped according to their temporal distance from the imagined self-location in time (4 and 12 years in Experiment 1; 1–10
and 11–20 years in Experiment 2). Error bars indicate intersubject SEM. RTs were found to be signiﬁcantly higher for shorter temporal distances from the imagined
self-location in time. Note the similarity of these two effects between the two experiments.
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presented faces or events refer to time-points before (relative-past) or
after (relative-future) the imagined self-location in time (rMT). These
two aspects of MT were reﬂected at the behavioural level, as RTs and
ERs for both faces and events were higher for past and future self-
locations in time than for the present time (aMT effect). In addition, in
all self-locations in time, participants were faster and more accurate for
relative-future than relative-past (rMT effect). This was found for faces
as well as for events. These effects were also borne out at the neural
level, activating a network common for both experiments consisting of
the right anteromedial temporal lobe, posterior parietal cortex
bilaterally, left inferior frontal cortex, insula bilaterally and right
temporo-parietal junction. Although the two types of stimuli (faces
and events) are traditionally employed to test two different perceptual
and cognitive faculties and recruit different brain mechanisms in the
fusiform face area (Experiment 1) (Kanwisher et al., 1997) and in the
medial-temporal lobe (Experiment 2) (Squire et al., 2004), the present
data show that common brain mechanisms related to self-projection in
time were employed in responses to both stimuli.
Memory and absolute mental time
Seminal work regarded MT as ‘episodic thinking’, a combination of
episodic memory recall and episodic future imagination (Tulving,
1985, 2002; Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Levine, 2004; Levine et al.,
2004; Schacter et al., 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), whereas
more recent authors proposed that MT can be seen as ‘self-projection’
in time, similarly to ‘self-projection’ in space, emphasizing the role of
visuo-spatial perspective taking, spatial navigation and mental imag-
ery in MT (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis et al., 2007; Arzy
et al., 2008). Regarding the ﬁrst approach, episodic thinking relies
extensively on brain mechanisms in the anteromedial temporal lobe,
which is a crucial structure for processing both semantic and episodic
information, as found in clinical and neuroimaging studies (Corkin,
2002; Levine, 2004; Squire et al., 2004; Svoboda et al., 2006). In the
present study, activity in the anteromedial temporal lobe reﬂected aMT
not only in Experiment 2, employing episodic memory, but also in
Experiment 1, employing memory processes related to faces. This
points to the role of the anteromedial temporal lobe in MT not only
with respect to memorizing and imagining events but also with respect
to memorizing and imagining one’s faces from different points of time.
With respect to aspects concerning ‘self-projection’ in MT (Buckner &
Carroll, 2007), the anteromedial temporal lobe was found to be a key
region in both egocentric and allocentric spatial representation for both
future imagery and past retrieval (Hassabis et al., 2007; Burgess,
2008; Spreng et al., 2009). Our ﬁndings suggest the implication of this
region in aspects of MT that are related to self-projection in time.
Analysis of the event-related fMRI signal also showed an aMT
effect in the left inferior frontal gyrus. The left inferior frontal cortex
was shown to be involved in several different memory functions,
including working memory, semantic memory and episodic memory
(Dolan & Fletcher, 1997; Nyberg et al., 2003), as well as the
encoding, sorting and retrieving of memory items (Dolan & Fletcher,
1997; Badre & Wagner, 2007). Mesulam (2002) highlighted the role
of this region in transposing one’s ‘reference point (or self-location)
from self to other, from here to there, and from now to then’. Tulving
(1985) speciﬁed that the frontal cortex is important for the awareness
of one’s existence across subjective time and Fuster (1989) proposed it
to be essential for re-experiencing the past and foreseeing the future.
Others emphasized the role of the inferior frontal cortex in processing
self-referential information (Gusnard et al., 2001; Maguire, 2001;
Johnson et al., 2002; Okuda et al., 2003; Gilboa, 2004; Gilboa et al.,
2004; Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007), including autobio-
graphical memory and personal future events (although the activations
in some of these studies were more medial and dorsal than those
reported here).
Differences between self-locations in time were also found in the
posterior parietal cortex in both experiments. Similarly to the
anteromedial temporal lobe, the posterior parietal cortex is also
implicated in both episodic thinking and spatial representation (Addis
et al., 2007; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007; Arzy
et al., 2008; Spreng et al., 2009). With respect to episodic thinking,
the posterior parietal cortex was implicated in visual imagery of the
retrieved or imagined episodes (Gilboa, 2004; Gilboa et al., 2004;
Levine, 2004; Levine et al., 2004; Svoboda et al., 2006; Addis et al.,
2007; Szpunar et al., 2007). In addition, neuroimaging studies
reported activation of the posterior parietal cortex in mental imagery
in self- and space-related tasks, including motor imagery, mental
rotation and mental navigation as well as the distinction between
egocentric and allocentric reference frames (Zacks et al., 1999; Ruby &
Decety, 2001; Vogeley & Fink, 2003; Arzy et al., 2006; David et al.,
2006; Zacks, 2008). These previous data and the activation of this
region in both experiments emphasize the role of spatial aspects in
MT-related brain processes that we tested here using self-projection in
MT, requiring episodic thinking, mental-imagery and self. Taken
together, aMT for faces and events recruits brain mechanisms in the
anteromedial temporal lobe, posterior parietal cortex and inferior
frontal cortex related to episodic thinking, mental imagery, spatial
representation and the self jointly contributing to self-projection in
time.
Future anticipation and relative mental time
Participants were always faster and more accurate for relative-future
than relative-past (rMT effect), independent of their temporal self-
location and independent of the employed stimulus (faces or events).
This provides experimental evidence for proposals that MT is used
principally to anticipate future occurrences (Ingvar, 1985; Suddendorf&
Corballis, 1997, 2007; Dudai & Carruthers, 2005; Boyer, 2008).
Evolutionary considerations suggest that vivid episodic thinking may
be crucial for human decision making (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997,
2007; Boyer, 2008), enabling faster judgements related to future than
to past. The behavioural rMT effect was also expressed at the neural
level by the lower activations that we found for relative-future as
compared with relative-past found in the posterior parietal cortex and
insula. These structures have been proposed to combine aspects of MT
related to visual imagery and emotions. Implication of visual imagery
in episodic future thinking and past recall may rely on brain
mechanisms in the posterior parietal cortex, in agreement with
previous neuroimaging studies (Maguire, 2001; Conway et al., 2002;
Svoboda et al., 2006; Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007; Spreng
et al., 2009). Emotional engagement with past or future events is an
important aspect of MT (Sharot et al., 2004; Boyer, 2008). We argue
that emotional aspects of MT might be reﬂected in the activation of the
insular cortex and might also reﬂect emotional aspects related to the
self that have been called ‘self-referential emotions’ (Zinck, 2008).
The rMT effect in insular activation might reﬂect misalignment
between one’s past emotional affective state and one’s future
imagination (Sharot et al., 2004; Boyer, 2008), as well as higher
emotional load with respect to past faces and events. The insula was
proposed to provide the basis for the subjective image of the self as a
sentient entity and to accumulate updated information about one’s
body (Craig, 2002, 2003, 2004). The insular cortex has major
Subjective mental time 2015
ª The Authors (2009). Journal Compilation ª Federation of European Neuroscience Societies and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
European Journal of Neuroscience, 30, 2009–2017
connections to the anterior cingulate cortex, amygdala, hypothalamus
and prefrontal and orbito-frontal cortices (Augustine, 1996; Craig,
2003, 2004; Nagai et al., 2007). Functional neuroimaging studies
reveal this cortex to be activated by information regarding the body or
self, in order to regulate the body states accordingly (Craig, 2003,
2004). This is compatible with the present results showing insular
activation for self-projection in time and the rMT effect, proposing
insular implication in future regulation of body states.
Temporal distance in mental time
Activation at the right temporo-parietal junction showed a symmetrical
distribution of the fMRI signal change as a function of the temporal
distance of the faces ⁄ events from the present time. Thus, activation
was increased for relative-future as compared with relative-past in the
Past condition, activities were similar to relative-past and relative-
future in the Now, and higher activity was found for relative-past as
compared with relative-future in the Future condition (Fig. 3E).
A similar temporal distance effect of symmetrical distribution was
found in previous behavioural studies (D’Argembeau & Van der
Linden, 2004; Spreng & Levine, 2006; Arzy et al., 2009) and in our
behavioural data when we plotted the percentage of correct recall and
RTs as a function of the temporal distance between the imagined self-
location and the past and future life events or faces (Fig. 4). In all
conditions, RTs and ERs were aligned with the temporal distance of
the presented face ⁄ event from the imagined self-location in time. This
may be compatible with the role of the temporo-parietal junction in
coordinating the relation between one’s self-location in space and
different external reference points (Ruby & Decety, 2001; Vogeley &
Fink, 2003). In particular, previous studies have shown that the
temporo-parietal junction is a key structure for maintaining the
relations between one’s actual self-location in space (‘here’) and an
imagined one (‘there’) (Zacks et al., 1999; Ruby & Decety, 2001;
Vogeley & Fink, 2003; Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006; David
et al., 2006; Corradi-Dell’acqua et al., 2008) and that temporo-
parietal activation may depend on the spatial angle (or rotational
distance) between the subject’s actual and imagined self-location
(Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006). Based on these previous and
present behavioural and neural data, we speculate that this may be
similar, at least in part, when imaging temporal relationships between
habitual self-location in time (Now) and imagined ones (Past and
Future) that were investigated in the present study and that the
temporo-parietal cortex is a key structure for encoding the self in time
and space.
In conclusion, the present two experiments show MT to include
three independent components. (i) Similarity between self-projection
in time to past and future is encoded in the anteromedial temporal lobe
and inferior frontal cortex. (ii) Relative facilitation of future judge-
ments with respect to one’s past is encoded in the posterior parietal
cortex and insula. (iii) The dependency of MT on the temporal
distance between one’s self-location in time and memorized ⁄ imagined
faces and events is encoded at the temporo-pariatal junction. The
recruited brain regions were highly similar in both experiments, for
faces and events, suggesting that the distributed brain mechanisms of
MT as tested here are independent of whether actual life episodes have
to be re-experienced ⁄ pre-experienced. The multifunctional character
of this distributed network shows the complexity of MT, incorporating
classical memory structures and neural mechanisms related to mental
imagery and the self, allowing the description of MT as a multifaceted
cognitive faculty, essential to anticipate and pilot future behaviour
according to the present perception of past experiences.
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